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ABSTRACT
Thoroughbred incentive programs are subsidy policies funded from state parimutuel tax
revenue designed to promote regional race horse breeding and ownership. At issue is an
ongoing debate concerning the effectiveness of alternative policies. Empirical results in-
dicate that incentive programs have a positive economic effect, but gains to Thoroughbred
breeders can be obtained by reallocating tax revenue to non-restricted purses. A policy
allocating tax revenue to non-restricted purses shifts yearling demand and increases prices,
while breeder subsidies shift only the supply function and therefore lower prices. Conse-
quently,breeder revenues increase in response to a policy thatfavors non-restrictedpurses
over subsidies.
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Subsidy policies for agricultural commodities
have long been used as a means to stabilize
supply and augment demand. Thoroughbred
breeder/owner incentive programs are state ad-
ministered subsidy policies designed to pro-
mote regional race horse breeding and own-
ership. Currently, 28 states operate incentive
programs that transfer one-hundred million
dollars annually to Thoroughbred breeders and
owners (American Horse Council).
Breeder/owner incentive programs are
funded through a tax levied on parimutuel wa-
gering pools. This share of tax revenue is
transferred to owners and breeders under a va-
riety of alternative subsidy programs. The
state of Washington operated an incentive pro-
gram as early as 1945, and many states initi-
ated incentive programs in the 1960s and
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1970s. Each state has
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different policies re-
garding the administration and levels of fund-
ing across the alternative incentive programs.
Limited analysis exists evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of breeder/owner incentive pro-
gram policies. This is an ongoing concern due
to the high levels of expenditures and the lim-
ited growth in parimutuel wagering pools
across the nation. 1The objective of this study
is to develop an economic framework to eval-
uate the effectiveness of breeder/owner incen-
tive policies. Effectiveness will be measured
relative to incentive policies’ effects on the
supply of foals registered in a state, the year-
ling demand as determined by average year-
1Parimutuel horse racing handle increased a mar-
ginal 1.6%, $277.4 million, from 1996 to 1997. Since
1982, horse racing’s average annual rate of growth has
been 2%. Horse racing’s market share of total gaming
declined 0.41% from 6.80 to 6.39% from 1996 to
1997, and has declined to these levels from a 22%
market share in 1982 (Christianson).582 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
Iingprice instate sales, andthe combined net
effects of supply and demand on aggregate
breeder revenue.
Background and Literature Review
Each state’s incentive program differs in the
distribution of transfer payments to the breed-
ers and owners of state-bred horsesz that win
or place in races. Each state has different pol-
icies regarding the administration, levels of
funding and distribution of payments through
some or all five alternative incentive policies.
These policies are (1) breeder awards which
transfer money to the breeder of record of a
state-bred horse, (2) stallion awards which
transfer money to owners of stallions standing
in the state, (3) restricted race purses which
transfer money to the owner of a state-bred
horse winning/placing in a race restricted only
to state-bred horses, (4) owner awards which
transfer money to the owner of a state-bred
horse winning a non-restricted race open to all
horses meeting the race conditions regardless
of state of breeding. Owner awards are com-
prised of “owner bonuses” where the owner
receives incentive payments at the end of the
race meet and “purse supplements” where ad-
ditional purse money for state-bred horses
competing in open races are written as part of
the race conditions,3 (5) “other” awards which
is a miscellaneous category for state-bred
stakes races, stallion stakes, and other races
highlighting state-bred horses.
Table 1 shows the distribution of incentive
award payments, averaged from 1989 through
1995 for all states operating incentive pro-
grams. Restricted race owner awards account
for 53 percent of the distribution of incentive
2Generally, to be classified as a state-bred, the foal
must be conceived in the state and the mare must give
birth in the state,
3Owner bonuses are paid directly to owners, who
are not obligated to share the award with the winning
horse’s jockey or trainer, and bonuses do not accu-
mulate as part of the horse’s race earnings record.
Purse supplements are shared with the trainer and jock-
ey, in the same manner as traditional purses, and are
included in the horse’s race earnings record. Purse sup-
plements are included in purse distribution statistics
reported by race tracks and in aggregate state totals,








Stallion Owner Awards 5~o
Restricted Purses 53~o
Other Awards/Funding 270
Source: American Horse Council, 1989–1 995, average
over time and 28 states operating incentive programs. The
most current year available for aggregate incentive pro-
gram data is 1995.
award payments. Breeder and stallion awards
account for 22 and 5 percent of the distribu-
tion of incentive program payments, respec-
tively. Owner awards account for 18 percent
of the payment distribution, and “other”
awards account for 2 percent.
Of particular interest is the wide range in
incentive program expenditure per registered
foal across the 28 states operating incentive
programs (see Table 2). New York and New
Jersey rank first and second in incentive pro-
gram transfer payments, at $11,364 and
$11,100, followed by Illinois at $9,660 per
foal. Ohio ranks fourth with $5,653 incentive
payments per foal. In comparison, Maryland
and Washington rank twelfth and fourteenth in
expenditures at $2,191 and $1,486 per foal.
Kentucky, which ranks first in foal crop, ranks
twenty-fifth in incentive payment transfers at
$525 per foal. The majority of states, 64 per-
cent, provide $2,208 or less in incentive pay-
ment transfers per foal.
Incentive program payments in the Thor-
oughbred industry work differently than tra-
ditional agricultural support programs which
transfer payments to eligible producers. Gen-
erally, agricultural commodity support pro-
grams provide subsidy payments as the differ-
ence between the market price and a
government support price relative to a farm’s
production level subject to maximum payment
restrictions. Program benefits are not linked to
quality or production efficiency targets, In
comparison, Thoroughbred incentive pro-Neibergs and Thalheimer: Effectiveness of Thoroughbred Breeder/Owner Incentive Policies 583























































































































1Average annual total incentive program transfer pay-
ments per registered foal, 1989 to 1995.
grams are only paid to breeders/owners of
horses that win races, thereby directly incor-
porating market-based and clearly defined
quality targets. Also, government expenditures
on farm commodity support programs are af-
fected by stochastic yields and differences be-
tween market prices and target prices. This ex-
poses the government to budget risk. In
contrast, Thoroughbred breeder/owner incen-
tive transfer payments are directly linked to a
revenue source through the tax levied on pari-
mutuel wagering pools. Breeder and stallion
awards are calculated and paid at yezn-end, af-
ter tax revenues are known with certainty.
Purses for restricted races and owner awards
are set throughout the year and can be adjusted
relative to the growth or decline in parimutuel
pools. Any carry-over or short-fall in the in-
centive program funding is recovered in the
next calender year, thus eliminating govern-
ment budget risk.
While there exist a number of studies ex-
amining agricultural commodity supply poli-
cies (Shumway, Smith, and Richardson; Sun,
Kaiser, and Forker) and demand policies (Al-
ston, Carter, and Smith; Halliburton and Hen-
nebery), there is limited analysis of the effec-
tiveness of Thoroughbred breeder/owner
subsidies.
Degennaro examined the role of sire stakes
on the volume of wagering (handle) for har-
ness racing at Scioto Downs racetrack near
Columbus, Ohio. Degennaro did not find a di-
rect relationship between parimutuel handle
and sire stakes, indicating that the state-bred
sire stakes program had no economic impact
on wagering.
Model Specification
The hypothesis to be tested is that breeder/
owner incentive programs positively affect the
supply and demand of Thoroughbred blood-
stock. The empirical specification is based on
a structural Thoroughbred yearling supply and
demand model of inter-temporal equilibrium
with price expectations (Neibergs and Thal-
heimer) augmented to include breeder/owner
subsidy programs. The proposed model is a set
of state-level Thoroughbred market models as
specified by the following three equation sys-
tem:
Supply of Registered Foals
(1) RFOAL,, = a, + alRFOAL,t_, + a2P,(_2
+ a~BA1t.2 + @A,,_2
+ Ix~MTBit_z+ IxbFCI,t_2
+ aTSFEE,,_z + p,,.
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(2) YRL,, = RFOAL,, -I.
Inverse Demand For Yearlings
(3) P,, = PO+ ~,YRL,, + (3 ZPRSE,,+ ~~RPRSE,t
+ 1340A,t + 135YTF% + (3JWp,
+ &EXR, + ~8PCI,, + v,,
where i= l... n represents an index of state
level variables.
A working description of the model is pro-
vided herein. For a complete model definition
and justification of breeder price expectations
see Neibergs and Thalheimer. Equation (1)
represents a supply model of registered Thor-
oughbred foals, RFOALIV The model is based
on the hypothesis that breeding decisions are
dependent on expected yearling price and oth-
er supply factors. The decision to breed a mare
is made early in year t, which is followed by
an 11-month gestation period, to produce and
register a foal in year t + 1. The foal matures
for a year and is sold as a yearling in year t
+ 2. Therefore supply decisions are based in
part on breeders’ price expectations two years
in the future.
The Supply Model
Supply response is modeled where RFOAL,,
responds to state average price for Thorough-
bred yearlings lagged two years, P1,-2,to rep-
resent price expectations and reproductive
constraints associated with breeding decisions.
Due to the high asset fixity associated with
Thoroughbred breeding investments and the
long biological lag associated with breeding
decisions, the supply of Thoroughbred year-
lings changes gradually over time. The stick-
iness in supply response is in part attributable
to the large fixed capital investment associated
with horse production that is not easily liqui-
dated, the small difference in marginal cost
between a bred mare versus a non-productive
barren mare, and the biological constraints of
reproduction. Also, many breeders may not be
price responsive due to their willingness to
subsidize their Thoroughbred investment
through periods of non-profitability. A partial
adjustment process is represented by a one-
period lag of the endogenous variable,
RFOAL,,.
Breeder awards, BA,,.Z, and stallion
awards, SA1t-2, are transfer payments to Thor-
oughbred breeders and are measured in aggre-
gate state totals. They impact the expected re-
turns of breeding decisions and are included
in the supply side of the model. Tax benefits
are a primary consideration in Thoroughbred
investment decisions. Tax benefits are a better
indication than tax costs of federal tax policy
impacts on the yearling market, because tax
benefits apply equally to profitable and non-
profitable Thoroughbred investment decisions.
The effects of changes in federal tax policy
can be captured through an index that mea-
sures the present value of tax benefits from a
capital investment in a Thoroughbred brood-
mare (Hall and Jorgenson). The mare tax ben-
efit index, MTB~-2, represents the present val-
ue of the tax benefits generated from a fixed
capital investment in a Thoroughbred mare.4
A farm cost index, FCI,-Z, represents input
costs of production, and SFEE,~-z, represents
the state average advertised stud fee paid to
breed a mare. A stochastic error term is rep-
resented by p,,t.
Foal To Yearling Transfer
Thoroughbred foals are registered with the
Jockey Club as weanlings shortly after they
4 MTB, and YTBt are calculated for each year, t, in
the time series 1964–1 995 as the present value of ex-
pected maximum tax benefits from a fixed capital in-
vestment in a Thoroughbred breeding mare or yearling,
projected over its tax recovery period. For example,
MTB, is calculated as follows:
N TcnD,,, ctN
MTB, =~— —
.=, (1 + r)n + (1 + r)N
for t = 1964 . . . 1995
where: n is an annual index relative to year t, and N
is the tax recovery period of a mare which is seven
years and for a yearling its five years. Tn is the highest
personal marginal tax rate, Dn is annual depreciation
expense, C~ is the capital gains tax benefit when allowed
and O otherwise, and the discount rate, r, is fixed at 8
percent. Each tax policy variable is projected over the
seven-year tax planning horizon as expeeted in year t.Neibergs and Thalheimer: Effectiveness of Thoroughbred Breeder/Owner Incentive Policies 585
are born and become yearlings on the first Jan-
uary 1 after they are foaled. Equation (2) is an
identity that transfers RFOAL,, to the supply
of marketable yearlings, YRL,~. Once a foal is
registered, only death prevents it from becom-
ing a yearling. Since death loss rates are un-
available and presumed negligible and invari-
ant over time, an identity is used to transfer
foals to yearlings.
The Demand Model
Demand for Thoroughbred yearlings can best
be represented as a capital investment func-
tion. Equation (3) represents an inverse de-
mand function where the state average price
of yearlings, Pl~,is a function of the predeter-
mined supply of yearlings, YRL,,, and a set of
current exogenous variables. The price of a
capital asset, a Thoroughbred yearling being
no exception, is related to its earning potential.
For Thoroughbred yearlings those earnings are
the purses for which they compete plus incen-
tive program transfer payments targeting
Thoroughbred yearling/race-horse owners.
The state average purse per race, PRSEi~, re-
stricted race purses, RPRSE1,, and owner
awards, OA,~, represent yearling earning po-
tential.
The yearling tax benefit, YTB,, represents
the present value of the tax benefits from a
capital investment in a Thoroughbred yearling,
and is calculated in the same manner as MTB~.
Foreign investment influences the Thorough-
bred yearling market. The gross amount of
foreign purchases of Thoroughbred yearlings,
GFP,, and the exchange rate of United King-
dom pounds for U.S. dollars, EXR,, capture
the export influences of demand on the Thor-
oughbred market. Buyers from the United
Kingdom led foreign purchasers for many
years of the study. State per-capita income,
PCIiL,represents regional economic conditions.
The stochastic error term is v,,.
Because the feedback from the demand
equation to the supply equation is a lagged
response, the specified model is recursive. In
a recursive system, each endogenous variables
can be determined sequentially. Given values
for P,,-,, one can solve directly for RFOALi,
in the supply equation. Then, knowing
RFOAL1,, the value of Pitcan be solved recur-
sively in the demand equation.
Data
Data availability constrained the scope of
states included in the model. A number of
states failed to maintain an archive of incen-
tive program transfer payments. Other states
did not conduct yearling auction sales, so data
on P,~ is unavailable in those states. Three
states are included in the model based on the
comparability of their Thoroughbred indus-
tries. Annual data from 1964 to 1995 for
Washington, Maryland and Ohio were ana-
lyzed. These states represent a geographical
dispersion of Thoroughbred production, and
rank seventh, ninth and twelfth in foal crop
size in the United States. Over the study pe-
riod, Washington’s incentive program consist-
ed of restricted race purses, owner awards and
breeder awards. Maryland’s incentive program
consisted of restricted race purses, owner
awards, breeder awards, and stallion awards.
Ohio’s incentive program consisted of restrict-
ed race purses, owner awards, breeder awards,
and stallion awards.
Data on RFOAL1, were obtained from The
Jockey Club Fact Book. Data on P,, and GFPi,
were collected from Annual Auction Review
(The Blood-Horse) and represent an annual
summary of yearling auctions in North Amer-
ica. Data on GFP, are available only from
1973 to 1995. Prior to 1973 foreign purchases
were relatively insignificant and were not re-
ported separately. Essentially GFP, is a vari-
able with a constant value of O assumed for
years prior to 1973 and actual data used when
GFP, rose to a level of significance to be re-
ported separately. Data on PRSE,, were col-
lected from The American Racing Manual.
Data on RPRSEit, OAi~, BA,,, and SA,, were
collected from individual states’ annual racing
commission reports. MTBt_2 and YTBt were
calculated using data from Standard Federal
Tax Reports: Depreciation Guide and the In-
ternal Revenue Code (Commerce Clearing
House). Data on FCIt were collected from Ag-
ricultural Statistics (USDA). Data on SFEE1~-a586 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
were collected from the annual Stallion Reg-
ister (The Blood-Horse). An annual average
stud fee was calculated by averaging all ad-
vertised stud fees in the register per year for
each state in the study. Data on PCI,, were ob-
tained from the Statistical Abstract of the
United States. Data on EXR,, and the consum-
er price index used to deflate data expressed
in monetary units were obtained from the Ci-
tibase Data Base. The sources of data for each
of these data series are, respectively, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Foreign Exchange Rates; and U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consum-
er Price Index. Descriptive statistics are pre-
sented in the Appendix.
Results and Discussion
The specified state level Thoroughbred year-
ling market model was estimated using Kmen-
ta’s method of pooling cross-section time-se-
ries data, which assumes autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity (Kmenta). Shazam 8.0
econometrics software was used to estimate
model parameters. Due to problems of multi-
collinearity in the supply model between
BA1,.2 and SAI,.2, the relatively small distri-
bution of incentive transfer payments through
SAlt.2, and since these awards largely target
the same Thoroughbred breeder, they were
combined into one variable, BASAi~.z, by add-
ing them together, A dummy variable for
Maryland, MADUM, was included in the
model, because of an extraordinary price drop
which occurred in 1974 to the present. This
reflects the export of Maryland’s higher qual-
ity horses to more lucrative markets in Ken-
tucky and New York through the Fasig-Tipton
auction house (Finney). A squared per-capita-
income variable, SQPCI, was introduced to
better reflect the high disposable income de-
mographic characteristic of yearling investors.
Estimated results are presented in Table 3.
Overall model results support the suggested
model specification, based on the consistency
of estimated parameters with what is expected
from economic theory, and statistical mea-
sures of significance and goodness of fit.
All variables in the supply model are sta-
tistically significant and have a Buse R2 of
0.97. Although SFEE,,-Z is a production cost
and its anticipated sign is negative, the sign on
the estimated parameter is positive and insig-
nificant. The incorrect sign is due to the rela-
tionship between stud fees and yearling prices.
Stud fees are set relative to the strength of the
yearling market. This is evidenced by a posi-
tive and statistically significant correlation co-
efficient between P,,., and SFEE,,, of .333 (p
= 0.002). Breeders are willing to pay in-
creased stud fees as they expect the marginal
value product of YRL1[ to increase as shown
by a positive correlation coefficient of. 197 (p
= 0.063) between SFEE,,-2 and P,,.
The Buse R2 in the demand model is 0.84.
All model variables except for variables mea-
suring export influences of the market are sta-
tistically significant. The states included in the
study are regional markets, and typically do
not have the quality of horses to attract inter-
national buyers. The estimated parameters of
PCI,, and SQPCI,, are negative and positive re-
spectively, These nonlinear results represent
the large disposable income demographic
characteristics of yearling investors. The key
model variables of PRSE~, RPRSE~ and OA,
are statistically significant at a 1-percent level
of significance, and BASA~.2 is significant at
a 2-percent level of significance. All breeder/
owner incentive program variables are positive
and statistically significant, indicating a posi-
tive economic impact. Their elasticities are
calculated to evaluate their effectiveness.
Supply and Demand Parameter Elasticities
The short-run supply elasticities and price
flexibilities presented in Table 4 are all inelas-
tic, with the exception of PRSE, which has a
price flexibility of 1.108, and PCI,. The price
flexibility of owner award programs OA, and
RPRSE, are similar at 0.111 and 0.101. Supply
response is price inelastic, 0.086, and breeder
awards, BASA~ is also inelastic, 0.079. These
results are consistent with the elasticities es-
timated by Neibergs and Thalheimer. The
price flexibility of PRSE, of 1.108 in this study
is lower than the purse flexibility of 2.606 es-
timated in Neibergs and Thalheimer. Two rea-Neibergs and Thalheimer: Effectiveness of Thoroughbred Breeder/Owner Incentive Policies 58’7
Table 3. Thoroughbred Breeder/Owner Model Empirical Results
Supply (RFOALJ Demand (P,)
Signifi- Signifi-
Estimated cance Estimated cance





















































































1The top number is the estimated parameter and the bottom number in parentheses is the standard error.
2Exact probability of rejecting HO: ~, = O.
Variable Definitions: RFOAL = supply of registered foals, P = yearling price, BASA = breeder and stallion awards
combined, MTB = mare tax benefit, FCI = farm cost index, SFEE = stud fee, MADUM = dummy variable repre-
senting Maryland, YRL = the supply of yearlings, PRSE = purses, RPRSE = restricted purses, OA = owner awards,
YTB = yearling tax benefit, GFP = gross foreign purchases, EXR = exchange rate, PCI = per-capita income, SQPCI
= PCI squared, t = annuaI time frame with appropriate lags.
sons may account for the lower response, In
Neibergs and Thalheimer the purse variable
was an aggregate of purses, restricted purses
and owner awards. Second, data was aggre-
gated to a national level in comparison to the
state-level data used in this study.
Long-Run Comparative Statics
The derivation of the final form of the model
by substituting the supply model, equation (1),
into equation (3) takes into account the inter-
action of supply and demand simultaneously.
If a disequilibrating change occurs in the form
of a variation in an exogenous variable, the
initial equilibrium will be upset. Endogenous
variables (RFOAL and P) adjust relative to the
new value of the exogenous variable, plus the
recursive adjustments between RFOAL and P
until long-run equilibrium is reached. Long-
run supply elasticities and price flexibilities of
key model variables are presented in Table 5.
The long-run elasticities determine the relative
effectiveness of the alternative breeder incen-
tive programs.
The policy in question is how to effectively
allocate state tax revenue from parimutuel tax-
es to best promote Thoroughbred breeding588 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
Table 4. Short-Run Supply Elasticities and Demand Flexibilities at the Mean
Supply (RFOAL,) Demand (P,)
Variable Elasticity Variable Flexibility
RFOAL,_ , 0.828*** YRL, –0.236*
P,_, 0.086*** PRSE, 1.108**
13 ASA,., 0.079** RPRSE, O.1O1***
MTB,-, O.21O*** OA, O.111**
FCI,.2 –0.131** YTB, 0.686***




Notes: One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and I% level, respectively.
Variable Defimtions: RFOAL = supply of registered foals, P = yearling price, BASA = breeder and stallion awards
combined, MTB = mare tax benefit, FCI = farm cost index, SFEE = stud fee, YRL = the supply of yearlings, PRSE
= purses, RPRSE = restricted purses, OA = owner awards, YTB = yearling tax benefit, GFP = gross foreign purchases,
EXR = exchange rate, PCI = per-capita income, SQPCI = PCI squared, t = annual time frame with appropriate lags.
within a state. Each state has the authority to
allocate funds to the non-restricted purse ac-
count, PRSE,t, across its breeder award pro-
grams, BASAL,, or to the owner award pro-
grams, RPRSE,, and OA,,. Relative to the
objective of promoting regional Thoroughbred
breeding, the long-run elasticities indicate that
PRSE has the greatest effect on RFOAL with
a long-run elasticity of 0.521, followed by
BASA with a long-run elasticity of 0.432.
BASA is a direct transfer payment to breeders
which stimulates foal supply. However, the
BASA policy works against itself by decreas-
ing price, since there is a long-run increase in
supply without a commensurate increase in
demand.
The market intervention effects from a pol-
icy decision to introduce or increase BASA
are illustrated in Figure 1. Starting at a point
of long-run equilibrium, the short-run foal
Table 5. Long-Run Comparative Statics of Key Model Variables
Long-Run Supply (RFOAL) Long-Run Demand (P)
Comparative supply Long-Run Comparative Long-Run
































] The result is the evaluation of the comparative static using the estimated coefficients from the supply and demand
equations.
2Elasticity and flexibility estimates are calculated at the mean.
Variable definitions: RFOAL = supply of registered foals, PRSE = purses, RPRSE = restricted purses, OA = owner
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Figure 1. Economic Effects of BASA Policy
Introduction
supply, RFOALs~, the long-run foal supply,
RFOAL~~, and long-run yearling demand, D~~
are at equilibrium, resulting in an equilibrium
price of P~. The expansion in BASA transfer
payments can be expressed on a per-foal basis
as P~A~~.The intervention of the BASA ex-
pansion policy creates an upward biased price
signal of PB plus P~AsA. In the short run,
RFOAL~~ is perfectly inelastic due to the two-
year biological production constraint. Breeders
benefit by receiving the equilibrium price plus
the breeder awards. The short-run breeder
gain, identified in Figure 1 as the darkly shad-
ed rectangle area, is shared among existing
breeders based on established BASA distri-
bution policy. In the short run, there is no ef-
fect on consumers, or in this case yearling
buyers, due to the inelastic supply of foals. In
the long run, breeders respond to the upward
biased price signal of P~plus P~~~A by increas-
ing the foal supply to RFOAL~A~A. The long-
run supply elasticity of BASA is 0.432. The
expanded supply in turn forces a market clear-
ing price decrease to P~c. The long-run price
flexibility of BASA is –O. 102 (see Table 5).
A consumer gain occurs in the long run as
supply expands and price decreases, and is
identified in Figure 1 as the lightly shaded
area. In effect, a foal surplus is created by the
non-market intervention of BASA as the dif-
ference between RFOAL~A~A and the supply
of foals relative to P~c of RFOAL~c. Net
breeder gain in the long run depends on the
Table 6. Breeder Revenue From a 109o In-
crease in Non-Restricted Purses Versus Breed-
er Awards.




















































Breeder’ revenue is YRL,*P, + BASA,. BASAC = O when
analyzing the policy to increase purses.
YRL = the supply of yearlings, P = yearling price, BASA
= breeder and stallion awards combined, t = annual time
frame.
magnitude of the price flexibility and supply
elasticity of BASA. There is no additional
long-run breeder gain from BASA. BASA is
a target transfer payment based on the level of
parimutuel handle, and it is independent of
foal supply and price. Therefore as foal supply
expands, there is increased competition be-
tween breeders for the relatively fixed level of
breeder awards.5
The breeding sector’s marginal revenue
would increase by allocating revenue to PRSE,
over BASAL, because PRSEt provides a posi-
tive stimulus to both supply and price. The
long-run supply elasticity of PRSE is 0.521,
and its price flexibility is 0.985. Table 6 illus-
5Breeder awards are relatively fixed once a policy
is enacted, because parimutuel handle levels are rela-
tively stagnant. An increase in breeder awards requires
a policy change to increase its share of parimutuel tax
revenue.590 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
trates the change in total breeder revenuec in
response to alternative policy scenarios that
increases PRSE~ or BASA~ by 10 percent. The
analysis is based on using the average for each
variable in the model to calculate the initial
long-run equilibrium. Starting from a point of
long-run equilibrium, year O, breeder revenue
is $8.49 million. Both policy options are ini-
tiated in year 1. Considering the policy option
to increase PRSE,, P, responds immediately to
the increase in PRSEL,and breeder revenue in-
creases to $9.64 million in year 1. Breeder
revenue stays at this level for the two-year
time lag required for breeders to adjust supply
relative to an exogenous shock. From years 3
to 15, breeder revenue increases to $9.83 mil-
lion as the market adjusts to a new long-run
equilibrium. Under the PRSE, policy option, it
takes 10 years to achieve 95 percent of the
adjustment to long-run equilibrium. In con-
trast, the policy option of increasing BASA,
increases breeder revenue to $8.56 million in
years 1 and 2, reflecting the increase in BASA,
transfer payments. Starting in year 3, breeder
revenue increases as supply responds to the
increase in BASA~, and increases to $8.69 mil-
lion by year 15. This policy option takes the
full 15 years illustrated in the table to achieve
95 percent of the adjustment to the new long-
run equilibrium.
The total revenue generated over the 15-
year simulation period further illustrates dif-
ferences between the two policy options. The
sum of breeder revenue over the 15-year sim-
ulation period is $146.5 million and $129.7
million for the PRSE~ and BASA~ policies, re-
spectively. Comparing the present value of the
revenue streams between the two policy op-
tions shows additional strength in the PRSE,
policy option. Using a real discount rate of 2
percent, the present value of the stream of
breeder revenue over the 15-year simulation
period is $125.5 and $111.1 million for the
PRSE, and BASA, policies respectively. The
$14.4 million difference in present value re-
flects the PRSE, policy’s higher annual reve-
nue, immediate revenue increases, and a faster
adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium.7
There are additional indirect effects of the
BASA policy on breeders. The direct effects
are the revenue benefits to breeders when the
BASA policy was initiated. However, revenue
benefits of price support policies are largely
capitalized into the values of land and spe-
cialized production resources (Pasour), and the
increased capitalized values impede entry into
the business by reducing investment profit-
ability. The economic gains to breeders from
a policy to increase BASA funding are likely
to be short term or transitional as breeder
gains are capitalized into higher specialized
production input costs: land, broodmares, and
stud fees, for example. The distribution of
gains between breeders and the owners of spe-
cialized production inputs depends on how
quickly the expected benefits of policy chang-
es in BASA are incorporated into asset values.
The more quickly asset values rise when pro-
gram benefits are increased, the more asset
owners benefit from the gain. Thus the BASA
policy results in a transitional gains trap. Once
a price support program is in operation, its
elimination imposes losses on owners of spe-
cialized resources regardless of whether they
benefitted from the original windfall.
Conclusions
At issue is an ongoing debate concerning the
effectiveness of alternative breeder/owner in-
centive programs. This study developed an
empirical tool to measure the relative effec-
tiveness of alternative Thoroughbred incentive
programs to promote the breeding sector. Em-
pirical results indicate that breeder/owner
awards have a positive economic effect, but
gains in foal supply, yearling demand and
breeder revenue can be obtained by allocating
revenue to non-restricted purses. Allocating
revenue to non-restricted purses shifts demand
and increases price, while breeder subsidies
cTotat revenue to breeders is YRL,.P, + BASA,.
BASA, = Owhen analyzing the policy to increase purs-
es.
7The $14.4 million real (base = 1982–1984) total
present value breeder revenue difference between pol-
icy options corresponds to a $21,8 million difference
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shift only the supply function and therefore
lower price. Consequently, breeder revenues
increase in response to a policy that favors
non-restricted purses over subsidies. This pol-
icy may have further benefits outside of those
identified by this model. Increased purses im-
prove the quality of horses running in a race
and may increase the field size of the race,
both of which have been shown to increase
parimutuel handle (Thalheimer and Ali).
Implementing the policy recommendation
of transferring the BASA funding to non-re-
stricted purses will be met with resistance.
First, breeder and stallion awards are direct
transfer payments to breeders, and they pro-
vide a competitive ranking of merit based on
the amount of breeder awards received. These
utility enhancing aspects of breeder awards are
not provided by a policy that increases purses.
Second, a policy recommendation to eliminate
BASA imposes losses on breeders because of
the loss in expected earnings and the loss of
capitalizing BASA benefits into the value of
specialized resources used in foal production.
Policies that redistribute wealth are difficult to
change if they adversely affect the interests of
well-organized interest groups, such as breed-
er associations. The results from this study in-
dicate that market-based policies of non-re-
stricted purses, and the resulting competition
between horses, is the most effective policy
for Thoroughbred breeding.
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Appendix Table. Summary Statistics of Variables in Model System (1966-1995)1
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
RFOAL[ 1,159 440 362 2,020
RFOAL.I 1,146 452 291 2,020
P, 5,987 3,138 1,048 13,194
P,.2 5,999 3,149 1,048 13,194
BA,_z 579,930 323,570 0 1,260,900
SA,-, 104,890 133,960 0 446,440
FCI,.2 640 267 270 1,000
YTB, 3,195 797 1,837 4,569
MTB,., 2,452 662 1,453 3,732
SFEE,-2 1,887 421 1,123 2,555
PRSE, 6,677 3,182 3,565 15,546
RPRSE, 1,555,000 1,673,800 0 6,542,000
OA, 627,910 759,100 0 2,186,000
GFP~ 33,951,000 35,438,000 0 118,400,000
EXR, 197 42 130 279
PCI, 80 38 30 161
SQPCI, 7,775 6,856 912 25,921
I All monetary data have been deflated by the consumer price index where 1984 = 100.
2Mean, median and standard deviation are calculated using non-zero data from 1973–95.
Variable Definitions: RFOAL = supply of registered foals, P = yearling price, BA = breeder awards, SA = stallion
awards, FCI = farm cost index, YTB = yearling tax benefit, MTB = mare tax benefit, SFEE = stud fee, PRSE =
purses, RPRSE = restricted purses, OA = owner awards, GFP = gross foreign purchases, EXR = exchange rate, PCI
= per capita income, SQPCI = PCI squared, t = annual time frame with appropriate lags.